Philosophy

The organization of higher education across the world is one of several factors that conspire to create the assumption that our own map of the intellectual disciplines is, broadly speaking, valid cross-culturally. This book challenges this in relation to eight main areas of human endeavour, namely philosophy, mathematics, history, medicine, art, law, religion, and science. The book focuses on historical and cross-cultural data that throw light on the different ways in which these disciplines were constituted and defined in different periods and civilisations, especially in ancient Greece and China, and how the relationships between them were understood, particularly when one or other discipline claimed hegemonic status (as happened, at different times, with philosophy, history, religion, and science). It also explores the role of elites, whether positive (when they foster the professionalization of a discipline) or negative (when they restrict recruitment to the profession, when they insist on adherence to established norms, concepts, and practices and thereby inhibit further innovation). The issues are relevant to current educational policy in relation to the ever-increasing specialization we see, especially in the sciences, and to the difficulties encountered in making the most of the opportunities for inter- or trans-disciplinary research.

Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis. While these terms seem ambiguous between actuality/potentiality and activity/capacity, Aristotle did not intend them to be so. Through a careful and detailed reading of Metaphysics Theta, the author argues that we can solve the problem by rejecting both ‘actuality’ and ‘activity’ as translations of energeia, and by working out an analogical conception of energeia. This approach enables the author to discern a hitherto unnoticed connection between Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, and to give satisfying interpretations of the major claims that Aristotle makes in Metaphysics Theta, the claim that energeia is prior in being to capacity (Theta 8), and the claim that any eternal principle must be perfectly good (Theta 9).

The book is about three things. First, how Ancient thinkers perceived humans as like or unlike other animals; second about the justification for taking a humane attitude towards natural things; and third about how moral claims count as true, and how they can be discovered or acquired. Was Aristotle was right to see continuity in the psychological functions of animal and human souls? The question cannot be settled without taking a moral stance. As we can either focus on continuity or on discontinuities, how should natural science draw the boundaries? Moral agents act and react in a world that they see under a certain description, and there is no value free science that can settle what is the correct description. This book asks us to think about where moral justification could come from, and suggests that the supposed ‘moral status’ of the object cannot provide the answer. For the moral status of the object is a product of our own imagination, and once we see that, we also see that there remains the question where we ought to have the will to see it. Furthermore, since the perception of moral truth involves the development of imagination and will, the means to attain it will be better served by engagement with poetry and literature than with enquiries that seek to exclude the engagement of the imagination, or any appeal to the beauty of nature or the love of one's fellow creatures.

The Discourses of Epictetus, an emancipated Graeco‐Roman slave, are the most powerful surviving record of an ancient Stoic teacher at work. This book offers a comprehensive analysis of Epictetus’ philosophy as a guide to life, focusing on his dialectical methodology, principal ideas, and long‐term influence. It also shows, for the first time, how strongly he aligned his thought and educational goals with those of the Platonic Socrates. The first part of the book treats Epictetus’ intellectual and cultural context and the conversational style of the Discourses. In the second part, the core of his philosophy is found to consist in four fundamental themes: freedom, judgement, volition, and integrity. The book is also intended to serve as a guide to reading and sampling Epictetus, and it includes numerous excerpts from the Discourses in the author's original translations. Long finds Epictetus a thinker whose theism (though non‐Christian) is strikingly personalist, and whose acute psychological analysis scarcely needs updating.

This book is a collection of papers to celebrate the life and work of Jonathan Barnes. The papers cover a wide range of topics in ancient epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and logic, with two papers on contemporary issues in logic.

Relativism, the position that things are for each as they seem to each, was first formulated in Western philosophy by Protagoras, the 5th century BC Greek orator and teacher. This book focuses on the challenge to the possibility of expert knowledge posed by Protagoras, together with responses by the three most important philosophers of the next generation, Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus. In his book Truth, Protagoras made vivid use of two provocative but imperfectly spelled out ideas. First, that everyone is a ‘measure’ of the truth, and that everyone is already capable of determining how things are, since the senses are the best and most credible guides to the truth. Second, given that things appear differently to different people, there is no basis on which to decide that one appearance is true rather than the other. Plato developed these ideas into a more fully worked-out theory, which he then subjected to refutation in the Theaetetus. Aristotle argued that Protagoras’ ideas lead to skepticism in Metaphysics Book G, a chapter which reflects awareness of Plato’s reaction in the Theaetetus. Finally, Democritus incorporated modified Protagorean ideas and arguments into his theory of knowledge and perception. There have been many important recent studies of these thinkers in isolation. However, there has been no attempt to tell a single, coherent story about how Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle responded to Protagoras’ striking claim, and to its perceived implications about knowledge, perception, and truth. This book offers a new account of this important chapter in the development of Greek epistemology.

This book presents a study of the ethics of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, who taught Virgil, influenced Horace, and was praised by Cicero. His works have only recently become available to modern readers, through the decipherment of a papyrus carbonized by the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD. The book examines Philodemus' theoretical principles in ethics, his contributions to moral psychology, his method, his conception of therapy, and his therapeutic techniques. Part I begins with an outline of the fundamental principles of Philodemus' ethics in connection with the canonical views of the Epicurean school, and highlights his own original contributions. In addition to examining central features of Philodemus' hedonism, the book analyses central concepts in his moral psychology, notably: his conception of vices, which it compares with that of the virtues; his account of harmful or unacceptable emotions or passions; and his theory of corresponding acceptable emotions or ‘bites’. The book then turns to an investigation of Philodemus' conception of philosophy as medicine and of the philosopher as a kind of doctor for the soul. By surveying his methods of treatment, the book determines the place that they occupy in the therapeutics of the Hellenistic era. Part II uses the theoretical framework provided in Part I to analyse Philodemus' main ethical writings. The works considered focus on certain vices and harmful emotions, including flattery, arrogance, greed, anger, and fear of death, as well as traits related to the administration of property and wealth.