Aesthetics

This book studies the relationship between function and aesthetic value, breaking with the philosophical tradition of seeing the two as separate. It begins by developing and defending, in a general way, the concept of Functional Beauty, exploring how the role of function in aesthetic appreciation has been treated by some notable thinkers in the history of aesthetics. It then considers the relationship to Functional Beauty of certain views in current aesthetic thought, especially what is called ‘cognitively rich’ approaches to the aesthetic appreciation of both art and nature. Turning to work on the nature of function in the philosophy of science, it argues that this line of enquiry can help solve certain philosophical problems that have been raised for the idea that knowledge of function plays an important role in aesthetic appreciation. Although philosophical discussions of aesthetic appreciation tend to focus largely and sometimes almost exclusively on artworks, the range of aesthetic appreciation is, of course, much larger. Not simply art, but also nature, architecture, and even more mundane, everyday things — cars, tools, clothing, furniture, and sports — are objects of frequent and enthusiastic aesthetic appreciation. Accordingly, the second half of the book considers the place and importance of Functional Beauty in the aesthetic appreciation of a broad range of different kinds of things. The final chapters explore Functional Beauty in nature and the natural environment, in architecture and the built environment, in everyday artefacts, events, and activities, and finally in art and the artworld. In each case, the book argues that Functional Beauty illuminates our aesthetic experiences and helps to address various theoretical issues raised by these different objects of appreciation.

This book explains the perceptual knowledge involved in aesthetic judgements. It does so by linking Kant's aesthetics to a critically upgraded account of his theory of knowledge. This upgraded theory emphasizes conceptual and imaginative structures, which Kant terms respectively, ‘categories’ and ‘schemata’. By describing examples of aesthetic judgement, it is shown that these judgements must involve categories and fundamental schemata (even though Kant himself, and most other commentators, have not fully appreciated the fact). It is argued, in turn, that this shows the aesthetic to be not just one kind of pleasurable experience amongst others, but one based on factors necessary to objective knowledge and personal identity, and one, indeed, which plays a role in how these capacities develop. The explanation of how individual aesthetic judgements claim universal validity, and the aesthetic basis of art, however, requires that the Kantian position is developed further. This is done by exploring his ideas concerning critical comparisons in the cultivation of taste, and art's relation to aesthetic ideas and genius. By linking earlier points to a more developed account of comparative critical factors, the Kantian approach offers a satisfying and comprehensive explanation of aesthetic experience and fine art. It is shown to also encompass some kinds of avant-garde work that were previously thought to limit its relevance.

According to the literary humanist, works of literature refer to the real world and make statements about that world which are of cognitive as well as aesthetic value; the two kinds of value are indeed intimately connected. This humanist also holds that such works have an objective meaning which is fixed at the time of their production and which is the same for all readers, then and thereafter. This book aims to defend literary humanism, so understood, against attacks from two directions. On the one hand, some analytically minded aestheticians have argued that works of literature do not bear referentially on the world and do not make true statements about it; others hold that such works do not make a contribution to knowledge; others again allow that works of literature may have cognitive value, but deny that this depends on their having truth or reference. On the other hand, reception-theorists and deconstructionists have rejected the humanist’s objectivist conception of literary meaning, and typically take a pragmatist and anti-realist approach to truth and meaning. This latter, poststructuralist assault on the traditional understanding of literature has often been accompanied by a radical politicization of its study. In defending literary humanism against these various forms of criticism, this book shows that the reading and appreciation of literature is a cognitive activity on a par with scientific investigation, and that it can and should be approached disinterestedly for the sake of what can be learnt about the world and our place in it.

Disgust has a strong claim to be a distinctively human emotion. But what is it to be disgusting? What unifies the class of disgusting things? This book sets out to analyze the content of disgust, arguing that life and death are implicit in its meaning. Disgust is a kind of philosophical emotion, reflecting the human attitude to the biological world. Yet it is an emotion we strive to repress. It may have initially arisen as a method of curbing voracious human desire, which itself results from our powerful imagination. Because we feel disgust towards ourselves as a species, we are placed in a fraught emotional predicament: we admire ourselves for our achievements, but we also experience revulsion at our necessary organic nature. We are subject to an affective split. Death involves the disgusting, in the shape of the rotting corpse, and our complex attitudes towards death feed into our feelings of disgust. We are beings with a “disgust consciousness,” unlike animals and gods—and we cannot shake our self-ambivalence. Existentialism and psychoanalysis sought a general theory of human emotion; this book seeks to replace them with a theory in which our primary mode of feeling centers around disgust.

The essays in this book cover a spread of topics in the philosophy of music: how music expresses emotion and what is distinctive to the listener's response to this expressiveness; the modes of perception and understanding that can be expected of skilled listeners, performers, analysts, and composers and the various manners in which these understandings can be manifest; the manner in which musical works exist and their relation to their instances or performances; and musical profundity. As well as reviewing the work of philosophers of music, a number of the chapters both draw on and critically reflect on current work by psychologists concerning music.

This book provides a contextualist ontology of musical works, distinguishing works for playback from ones for performance and, among the latter, studio from live performances. Works are variously thick or thin to the extent that they determine details of their faithful renditions. Through the element of interpretation, performances are richer in constitutive properties than are the works they faithfully present. Features of the musico‐historical context in which the work is created affect what the composer can make work‐determinative via the scores he issues as instructions to performers. Scores must be read in terms of the notional conventions and musical practices they take for granted. To be of a work, a performance must match its contents, must intentionally follow the work‐determinative instructions, and must be tied by a robust causal chain to the work's creation. Also, the performance must be at least minimally faithful, so the work can be recognized in it. Authenticity is a virtue in a performance, and only small departures from the ideal are acceptable when made for the sake of an interesting interpretation. Non‐Western music can remain authentic if it assimilates influences and changes in ways compatible with its traditions and values. Recordings simulate live performances or create virtual ones and, because the medium is not transparent, are to be understood and appreciated differently from live music‐making.

Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive a category for much more to be said about it than this; we should focus attention instead on the vaguely defined but interesting category of things rich in narrative structure. Such devices offer significant possibilities, not merely for the representation of stories, but for the expression of point of view; they have also played an important role in the evolution of reliable channels of information, an issue pursued in three chapter appendices. This book argues that much of the pleasure of narrative depends on early developing tendencies in human beings to imitation and to joint attention, and imitation turns out to be the key to understanding such important literary techniques as free indirect discourse and character‐focused narration. The book also examines irony in narrative, with an emphasis on the idea of the expression of ironic points of view; a case study of this phenomenon is offered. Finally, the book examines the idea of Character, as evidenced in robust, situation‐independent ways of acting and thinking, and its important role in many narratives. It is asked whether scepticism about the notion of Character should have us reassess the dramatic and literary tradition which places such emphasis on Character.