Psychology

First established at the end of the 19th century, the juvenile justice system has long been searching for an effective set of guiding principles. Over the last hundred years, through a series of piecemeal rulings, it has undergone an evolution from its original foundation on the rehabilitation model to the current “get-tough” system that increasingly treats juvenile offenders as adults. At present, there is no overarching theory or model of juvenile justice intervention in this nation or even in any given state. Juvenile justice policy is best characterized as a helter-skelter array, inconsistent across jurisdictions, with no overarching theoretical framework providing guidance. Indeed, the field is desperately in need of a coherent model to serve as a guide to policymaking. In recent years, substantial gains have been made in the relevant knowledge on juveniles and offender treatment. We know more about the cognition and functioning of minors generally, and juvenile offenders specifically, as well as about how they respond to different types of interventions. Public attitudes have softened since the height of the “get-tough” era, and many policymakers are open to new ideas as they recognize that the current system just isn't effective. This book presents a vision for a new juvenile justice system, founded on the evidence at hand and promoting the principles of rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The book develops its own juvenile justice policy proposals effectively by carefully addressing the problems with past policy approaches and recent theoretical contributions, the science underlying the new perspective to be elucidated in the book, and how that science informs the book's perspective. Most helpfully, it provides a detailed description of the proposed new model along with discussion of the procedural rules that should accompany its implementation, and articulation of the way in which the model would work in practice.

The legal system depends upon memory function in a number of critical ways, including the memories of victims; the memories of individuals who witness crimes or other critical events; the memories of investigators, lawyers and judges engaged in the legal process; and the memories of jurors. How well memory works, how accurate it is, how it is affected by various aspects of the criminal justice system—all these are important questions. This book tackles others as well. Can we tell when someone is reporting an accurate memory? Can we distinguish a true memory from a false one? Can memories be selectively enhanced, or erased? Are memories altered by emotion, by stress, by drugs? This book presents the current state of knowledge among cognitive and neural scientists about memory.

In 1966 the Supreme Court ruled that law-enforcement officers were required to inform criminal defendants about their rights to remain silent or have an attorney present during their interrogation. In the 40 years since the inception of the “Miranda rule,” its anticipated effect has not been realized. The purposes of this book are to examine the reasons why the goal of the authors of the Miranda ruling has not been met and to identify procedures that move the criminal justice system closer to this goal. Separate chapters deal with four causes: the limitations and compromises in the original decision, the problems in comprehension of the Miranda warnings by various vulnerable populations (adolescents, non-English speakers, the deaf, and the mentally-challenged), the decisions subsequent to the 1966 decision that have eroded its breadth and application, and the efforts by police to avoid the curtailments from the ruling. The final chapter examines possible remedies such as requiring the presence of an attorney when the rights are given and videotaping the entire interrogation.

Of all the activities done by the Supreme Court justices as they form their decisions on important cases, the oral arguments are the only step in the process visible to the public. Despite this transparency, critics of the oral argument phase question its usefulness, claiming that the one-hour arguments provide much less information to the justices than the 50-page briefs; furthermore, the justices have already made up their minds. This book challenges these claims and takes the position that the oral arguments are a significant part of the decision-making process. Justices can test the limits of claims made by the advocates in their briefs. Also, the argument procedure provides an opportunity for justices to sense the strength of feelings held by the other justices, and even try to persuade their colleagues as they question the advocates. Each oral argument offers a window into the justices’ thinking and even their unique personalities. This book gives empirical answers to a number of questions about the operation of oral arguments. Do justices “telegraph” the way they will later vote by the types and frequency of questions they ask each side? Does each justice have a distinctive way of questioning? Are some types of advocates more successful than others? Does it matter who the chief justice is?

Culpability and dangerousness are the two central issues raised by any sensible societal attempt to deal with antisocial behavior. For the past century, mental health professionals have been heavily involved in helping the law address these issues. But critics deride clinical testimony about culpability as disguised storytelling and tar expert predictions by comparing them unfavorably to coin flipping. They have been aided in these efforts by a series of decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court that appear to impose a relatively high threshold for expert testimony, one that requires that the testimony’s underlying assumptions be verified as reliable through scientific or other testing. Although many courts have yet to consider the implications of those decisions for behavioral science testimony, an increasing number of lower court decisions suggest that a more restrictive evidentiary regime is in the offing. This book is an effort to sort out whether that development would be a good thing. How we should go about proving culpability and dangerousness depends on a number of variables, including the governing substantive law, our ability to answer the questions that this law generates, the extent to which judges and juries can arrive at sensible conclusions without the help of experts, and whether the testimony proffered is from the government or from the person whose liberty is at stake. The book concludes that culpability and dangerousness are socially constructed concepts that probably cannot, and in any event should not, be determined solely through the scientific method.

This volume of essays examines the psychological processes that underlie judicial decision making. Chapters in the first section of the book take as their starting point the fact that judges make many of the same judgments and decisions that ordinary people make and consider how our knowledge about judgment and decision-making in general applies to the case of legal judges. Chapters in the second section focus on the specific tasks that judges perform within a unique social setting and examine the expertise and particular modes of reasoning that judges develop to deal with their tasks in this unique setting. Chapters in the third section raise questions about whether and how we can evaluate judicial performance, with implications for the possibility of improving judging through the selection and training of judges and structuring of judicial institutions. Together the essays apply a wide range of psychological insights to help us better understand how judges make decisions and to open new avenues of inquiry into the influences on judicial behavior.

With the media spotlight on the recent developments concerning the Supreme Court, more and more people have become increasingly interested in the highest court in the land. Who are the justices that run it and how do they make their decisions? The Psychology of the Supreme Court examines the psychology of Supreme Court decision-making. The book seeks to help us understand all aspects of the Supreme Court's functioning from a psychological perspective. It addresses factors of influence, including the background of the justices, how they are nominated and appointed, the role of their law clerks, the power of the Chief Justice, and day-to-day life in the Court. The author uses psychological concepts and research findings from the social sciences to examine the steps of the decision-making process, as well as the ways in which the justices seek to remain collegial in the face of conflict, and the degree of predictability in their votes.

Stress and trauma have potential to affect the behavior and performance of victims, litigants, witnesses, judges, jurors, police, and attorneys; this in turn can impact the functioning of the legal system as a whole. Stress and trauma can also affect the individual on a more personal level, affecting their relationships, job satisfaction and overall health. On the other hand, contact with the legal system has potential to promote wellbeing for many individuals, such as victims who feel that justice was served and jurors and judges who feel they have helped preserve the integrity of the legal system. This book consolidates the theory and research concerning the impact that being involved with the legal system has on a variety of groups. It also discusses the lengths the legal system has gone to in order to protect these individuals, such as counseling for jurors after stressful trials, and allowing children to testify by closed circuit TV. Finally, after reviewing the literature and summarizing the existing research, each chapter points out where research is lacking. In all, the book provides an overview of how being involved in the legal system can affect various groups of people ranging from witnesses to attorneys to victims.

In its roughly 25 years of existence, the trial-consulting profession has grown dramatically in membership, recognition, and breadth of practice. What began as a small activist group of social scientists volunteering their expertise to assist in the defense of Vietnam War protestors, has evolved into a diverse set of professionals from a range of educational and professional backgrounds. In spite of such enormous growth, the work of trial consultants has gone largely unexamined. Trial Consulting takes an in-depth look at the primary activities of trial consultants, including witness preparation, focus groups and mock trials, jury selection, change of venue surveys, and attorney presentation style. It also examines the profession’s struggle to define itself, resisting certification and licensure requirements, settling instead for a set of practice standards. The authors draw upon empirical and other scholarly work in the social sciences, recommended “best practices” from trial lawyers, and the written and spoken recommendations and reflections of the trial consultants themselves. Addressing a broad spectrum of topics ranging from handwriting analysis to medical malpractice cases, they also suggest reforms for improving the profession and the efficacy of the trial consultant in the courtroom. The result is a critical analysis of what trial consulting truly adds to, and detracts from, the administration of justice.

This book articulates how social science can be applied to inform improvements in correctional policy and practice across the criminal justice system. The chapters reflect an iterative collaboration between leading social scientists and criminal justice practitioners, and they offer practical summaries of empirically grounded guidelines for change. The chapters first provide a foundational overview of crime and incarceration in the U.S. and addresses key contextual factors that contribute to the problem of recidivistic violent crime. Basic principles of behavior modification, social learning, and correctional rehabilitation are clearly defined and then applied to institutional and community settings, and to both general offenders and those with complex needs (juvenile offenders and mentally disordered offenders) or complex risks (sex offenders). With a strong focus on improving interventions with individual offenders to reduce recidivism, this book aims to translate knowledge and research on “what works” into pragmatic recommendations for practitioners and policymakers.