Philosophy

This volume presents a synoptic history of British Idealism, the philosophical school which dominated British philosophy from the 1860s through to the early years of the following century. Offering detailed examination of the origins, growth, development and decline of this School of thought, providing clear explanation of its characteristic concepts and doctrines, and paying close attention to the published works of its philosophers, the volume restores to its proper place an until now almost wholly forgotten period of our native philosophical history. By covering all major philosophers involved in the movement (not merely the most famous ones like Bradley, Green, McTaggart and Bosanquet but the lesser known figures like the Caird brothers, Henry Jones, A.S. Pringle-Pattison and R.B. Haldane) and by looking at all branches of philosophy (not just the familiar topics of ethics, political thought, and metaphysics but also the less well documented work on logic, religion, aesthetics and the history of philosophy) the book brings out the movement's complex living pattern of unity and difference; something which other more limited accounts have tended to obscure.

The book examines the central tenets of Hume's epistemology and cognitive psychology. It adopts a two level approach. On the one hand, it considers Hume's thought in its own terms and historical context. So considered, Hume is viewed as a naturalist, whose project in the first three parts of the first book of the Treatise is to provide an account of the operation of the understanding in which reason is subordinated to custom and other non-rational propensities. Scepticism arises in the fourth part as a form of metascepticism, directed not against first-order beliefs, but against philosophical attempts to ground these beliefs in the ‘space of reasons’. On the other hand, it provides a critique of these tenets from a Kantian perspective. This involves a comparison of the two thinkers on a range of issues, including space and time, causation, existence, induction, and the self. In each case, the issue is seen to turn on a contrast between their underlying models of cognition. Hume is committed to the perceptual model, according to which cognition is regarded as a seeing with the ‘mind's eye’ of the relation between mental contents. By contrast, Kant appeals to a discursive model in which the fundamental cognitive act is judgment, understood as the application of concepts to sensory data. Regarded from the first point of view, Hume's account is deemed a major philosophical achievement, while seen from the second it suffers from a failure to develop an adequate account of concepts and judgments.

Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre were the giants of 20th-century “existentialism”, although neither of them was comfortable with that title. Their famous differences aside, they shared a “phenomenological” sensibility and described personal experience in exquisite and excruciating detail and reflected on the meaning of this experience with both sensitivity and insight. That is the focus of this book: Camus and Sartre, their descriptions of personal experience, and their reflections on the meaning of this experience. They also reflected, worriedly, on the nature of reflection. The thematic problem of the book is the relationship between experience and reflection. The book explores this relationship through novels and plays, Camus’ The Stranger, The Plague, and The Fall, Sartre’s Nausea and No Exit, and Sartre’s great philosophical tome, Being and Nothingness.

Alexis de Tocqueville is one of the most topical and debated figures in contemporary political and social theory. This introduction to de Tocqueville's thought examines in detail his classic works and their major themes. This book argues that Tocqueville's major themes tap into deep anxieties about democratic practices and his writings help us to identify the major fault lines in democracy at the turn of the new century. Beginning with a consideration of Tocqueville's distinctiveness against the historical background and intellectual context of his time, this book goes on to trace the development of his thought on democracy and revolution, history, slavery, religion, and gender, including chapters dealing with his writings on France and the United States. The final chapter then explores Tocqueville's historical legacy and his contemporary significance, illuminating the reasons why this displaced 19th century aristocrat has become one of the most topical figures in contemporary political and social theory.

Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism is one of the most important and influential texts in the history of Greek philosophy. This book examines those aspects of Pyrrhonian Scepticism as Sextus describes it in the Outlines—its commitment to the search for truth and to certain principles of rationality, its scope, and its consequences for action and agency—that are of special philosophical significance. It argues that the Sceptic is engaged in the search for truth and that since this is so, the Sceptic aims to satisfy certain basic rational requirements. This book explains how the fact that the Sceptic has this aim makes it necessary, as Sextus says it is, for the Sceptic to suspend judgement under certain conditions. It defends an interpretation of the scope of Scepticism according to which the Sceptic has no beliefs about how things are rather than merely appear to him to be. It then explores whether, and how, Sextus can respond to the objection that since the Sceptic lacks beliefs of this kind, he cannot act and Scepticism is not, as Sextus claims it is, a possible way of life.

While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. This book is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of their representationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other extant accounts (such as, for example, causal, teleofunctional and purely internalist accounts); and it has the advantage of providing an adequate solution to the problem of sensory misrepresentation within Descartes' internalist theory of ideas. In sum, the book offers a novel account of the representationality of Cartesian sensations; provides a panoramic overview, and critical assessment, of the scholarly literature on this issue; and places Descartes' theory of sensation in the central position it deserves among the philosophical and scientific investigations of the workings of the human mind.

Stephen Gaukroger traces the development of Descartes's thought in the social, religious, and intellectual context of seventeenth‐century Europe. Gaukroger describes Descartes's upbringing and his education at the Jesuit La Flèche collège, and shows the role these played in the development of his ground‐breaking work in philosophy and science. The book details the effects of his relationships with others on his work, both through collaboration and through conflict. It discusses the history of the composition of his major works and details their structure and content. It documents the correspondence, which played a major part in the development of his thinking, both before and after publication. The book concludes, as it begins, with his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia on the subject of the passions.